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Entry of Foreign Multinational Firms and Productivity Growth of Domestic Firms: 








This paper examines whether and how the entry of foreign multinational firms affects 
productivity growth of domestically owned firms, using Japanese firm-level data for the period 
2000-2007. Although there are a considerable  number of studies conducting productivity 
analyses on foreign multinationals and domestic firms for the manufacturing sector, there are 
few such studies for the service sector. Against this background, the present paper focuses on 
the role of foreign entry in the service sector, where cross-border trade is often difficult and 
firms are therefore less likely to be exposed to international competition.   
The results of the analysis suggest that foreign multinationals perform better than 
domestically owned firms in many sectors. However, although the productivity levels of the 
former tend to be higher than those of the latter, no significant difference in productivity growth 
rates is found. Moreover, once firm-fixed effects are controlled for, foreign presence in a 
particular industry tends to negatively affect the productivity growth rate of domestically owned 
firms in the industry. However, firms that are catching up with the productivity frontier enjoy 
positive FDI spillovers, implying that foreign entry accelerates productivity catch-up. 
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It has been argued that attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) can play an important role in a 
country’s economic development and in productivity growth. In addition to the entry effects 
associated with FDI – that is, the fact that the entry of high productivity foreign firms itself 
raises the overall productivity level in the economy – another reasons why many countries have 
adopted policies to promote FDI is the possible existence of positive spillover effects. FDI 
spillovers can occur through various channels. For example, if a new technology is successfully 
introduced by a foreign-owned firm, this will encourage domestic firms to adopt it. This channel, 
the so-called demonstration or imitation effect, involves the spillover of technologies and/or 
know-how. Another important channel is the increased competition induced by the entry of 
foreign firms. Competition from foreign-owned firms provides an incentive for domestic firms 
to be more productive  by  using  existing resources more efficiently and adopting new 
technologies. However, FDI spillovers are not always positive and depend on various factors 
such as the entry mode of FDI as well as the characteristics of foreign firms and of the domestic 
economy, sector, and firms.
1  Although FDI spillovers have already been widely investigated, 
empirical analyses based on firm-level data produce mixed results. For example, Aitken and 
Harrison (1999), examining Venezuelan manufacturing plants, found that foreign investment 
negatively affected the productivity of domestically-owned firms, while other studies, such as 
Haskel et al. (2007), who used plant-level data for U.K. manufacturing establishments, found 
positive spillover effects. Given these mixed results, a number of studies have examined the 
conditions under which FDI has positive spillover effects. Girma (2005), for example, 
highlights  the importance of the  absorptive  capacity of domestic firms. On the other hand, 
Javorcik (2004) suggests that positive FDI spillovers may take place through backward linkages, 
based on evidence that an increase in foreign presence in downstream sectors is associated with 
a rise in productivity of domestically-owned firms in supplying industries.
2
                                                  
1  See Crespo and Fontoura (2007) for a survey of the literature on FDI spillovers. 
  Another strand of 
literature focuses on the relationship between innovation incentives and FDI spillovers. Aghion 
et al. (2009) find that the productivity growth of incumbent firms is positively correlated with 
lagged greenfield foreign firm entry in technologically advanced industries, but not in laggard 
2  Along similar lines, Kugler (2006) highlights the importance of outsourcing relationships of 
foreign multinational firms with local upstream suppliers as a channel for technology diffusion and 
argues that positive FDI spillover effects can be seen between industries but not within industries.   2 
 
industries, suggesting that entry of technologically advanced foreign firms encourages 
incumbent innovation and productivity growth in sectors that are close to the technological 
frontier, whereas it discourages incumbent innovation and productivity growth in sectors further 
behind the frontier. Thus, the empirical evidence available to date is insufficient to allow us to 
draw definitive conclusions regarding the factors resulting in positive FDI spillovers. 
Moreover, most previous empirical studies are confined to analyses of the manufacturing 
sector. Therefore, particularly for the non-manufacturing sector, our knowledge on the issue 
raised here is still limited  and  there remains ample room for research  on  what  factors are 
relevant in order for recipient economies to enjoy positive FDI spillovers. 
In the case of Japan, the government set a target in 2003 to double inward FDI within five 
years in order to provide a boost to the stagnant economy. Moreover, given the fact that the 
service sector (including construction and utilities) accounts for nearly 80 percent of total GDP, 
raising productivity growth in the non-manufacturing sector has been one of the top policy 
priorities to increase the long-term growth potential of the economy. For the non-manufacturing 
sector, foreign entry may be more important than for  the manufacturing sector. Because 
international transactions are sometimes difficult for certain types of services, the service sector 
is less likely to be exposed to international competition than the manufacturing sector and hence 
to learn from foreign firms with advanced technology, management know-how, etc. In this sense, 
foreign entry should be particularly important for the service sector to improve productivity 
through competition effects and learning effects.
3
    In order to address the various shortcomings highlighted so far, this paper examines whether 
the productivity of  domestic firms is correlated with the  presence  of FDI in their  industry 
utilizing a Japanese large-scale firm-level dataset including data for firms in the service sector. 
  However, there are very few empirical 
studies on foreign entry effects in the service sector, mainly due to data constraints. One of the 
few exceptions is Arnold et al. (2007). Focusing on the case of the Czech Republic, the study 
finds that opening service sectors to foreign providers is a key channel through which services 
liberalization contributes to improved performance in  downstream manufacturing sectors. 
However, the study did not examine FDI spillover effects on domestic firms in the service sector 
itself.   
                                                  
3  Ito (2007), using data on listed Japanese firms, found that firms in the non-manufacturing sector 
achieved faster productivity growth at home than firms in the manufacturing sector after conducting 
direct investment abroad. This result suggests that the learning effect of FDI is larger for services 
firms than for manufacturing firms.   3 
 
The major contribution of this paper is to add to the literature by examining the spillover effects 
of foreign-owned firms on domestic firms in the service sector. Although at least some empirical 
studies on the manufacturing sector suggest that FDI improves productivity in the recipient 
economy through technology diffusion and other channels, it is possible that such channels of 
FDI spillover may not operate to the same extent in the service sector.
 Given the scarcity of 
empirical evidence on the service sector, the main purpose of this paper therefore is to examine 
the existence of FDI spillovers in the service sector. To the best of my knowledge, this study is 
the first rigorous empirical analysis of FDI spillover effects based on large-scale firm-level 
panel data for the service sector.   
The major findings of this paper are as follows. Both for the manufacturing and the service 
sector, negative FDI spillover effects on the productivity of domestically-owned firms are found 
once firm fixed effects are controlled for. Only firms whose productivity growth is relatively 
high  enjoy  positive spillover  effects from foreign-owned firms in the same industry. These 
results imply that foreign entry will not raise the overall productivity level of domestic firms 
unless low productivity firms are forced to exit or policies for raising the productivity levels of 
less productive firms go hand-in-hand with foreign entry. Moreover, the negative FDI spillover 
effect tends to be larger in the service than in the manufacturing sector, implying that there may 
be  systematic differences  in FDI spillover effects in the  manufacturing and the 
non-manufacturing sector.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
role of foreign-owned firms in Japan in terms of employment and value added. Section 3 then 
discusses the theoretical background and presents the empirical model  for the productivity 
spillover analysis, while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Characteristics of Foreign-Owned Firms in Japan 
2.1 Data 
Before examining aggregate-level and firm-level productivity in Japan, this sub-section 
briefly describes the  data used in this study. The data used is the firm-level panel data 
underlying the Basic Survey on Business Structure and Activities (BSBSA) collected annually 
by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). The survey covers all firms with at 
least 50 employees or 30 million yen of paid-in capital in the Japanese manufacturing, mining, 4 
 
and commerce sectors and several other service sectors. Although the survey started in 1992 
(data for fiscal 1991), data for 2000-2007 are used for this study because observations for the 
non-manufacturing sector – the main focus of this paper – increased substantially from the 2001 
survey (data for fiscal 2000).
4  Observations for firms for which data on sales, number of 
employees, total wages, tangible fixed assets, depreciation, or intermediate inputs are not 
positive or are missing for at least one year are dropped from the dataset for the analysis in this 
paper. After this screening, the unbalanced panel dataset contains approximately 24,000 firms, 
half of which are service sector firms.
5
   Utilizing the firm-level panel data, two kinds of productivity measures are constructed: labor 
productivity and total factor productivity (TFP). Because information about working hours at 
the firm level is not available, labor productivity is calculated as the real value added per 
employee. Real value added is calculated as real output minus real intermediate input using 
industry-level price deflators taken from the JIP Database 2009. TFP for each firm is calculated 
based on the production function estimated using the semi-parametric estimation technique 




   
2.2 Productivity trends in the Japanese economy and the presence of foreign-owned firms 
in Japan 
   While productivity in the Japanese economy overall has “only” stagnated since the 1990s, 
productivity in the Japanese service sector has  in fact fallen sharply and it has often been 
pointed out that both the level and the growth rate of productivity in the Japanese service sector 
are much lower than that in the manufacturing sector (e.g., Ministry of Health, Labour and 
                                                  
4  The survey contains detailed information on firm-level business activities such as the 3-digit 
industry in which the firm operates, its number of employees, sales, purchases, exports and imports, 
R&D and patents, the number of domestic and overseas subsidiaries, and various other financial data 
such as costs, profits, investment, and assets. Although the survey also asks non-manufacturing firms 
for information on exports and imports, they are required to provide the amount of trade in goods 
only. The survey does not cover international transactions in services. The firm-level data of the 
BSBSA were obtained through the Trade and Investment Facilitation Division, Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). However, the views 
expressed in this paper are solely those of the author, and do not present those of the METI. 
5  The industry classification and number of observations by industry are shown in Appendix Tables 
1 and 2, respectively. 




7    Moreover, an international comparative study on sectoral productivity levels 
undertaken  by  the EU  KLEMS project  reports that  the  productivity level in  some service 
industries in Japan such as trade and business services is only around 40–50 percent of the U.S. 
level in 1997 and that the relative productivity levels further deteriorated in 2005 compared with 
the corresponding levels in 1997 for most of the sectors.
8
Against this background, it has often been argued that improving productivity particularly in 
the service sector is a priority for the Japanese economy (METI 2007).
   
9
Let us begin by looking at the share of foreign-owned firms in the Japanese economy using 
the firm-level data underlying the BSBSA. Table 1 shows the number of foreign-owned firms by 
industry for the period 2000-2007. In this study, foreign-owned firms are defined as firms with 
33.4 percent or more foreign ownership.
  Inward FDI is expected 
to raise productivity in the Japanese economy by intensifying market competition and 
generating knowledge spillovers to domestic firms. However, as discussed in Section 1, the 
effects of foreign entry on the productivity of domestic firms are still unclear, particularly in the 
case of service industries.   
10  As can be seen in the table, the number  of 
foreign-owned firms increased until 2005 but then decreased in the following years.
11
                                                  
7  For example, Fukao et al. (2007) show that TFP growth in the service sector has been low since 
the 1970s and that it has further deteriorated since the 1990s. Similarly, Shinada (2003) shows that 
service sector TFP in the Japanese service sector in the 1990s was substantially lower than in the 
1980s. Furthermore, OECD (2001), comparing service sector labor productivity across countries, 
reports that labor productivity growth in Japan drastically declined in major service industries. For 
example, labor productivity growth in the wholesale and retail trade industry and the transportation 
and telecommunication industry stood at 4.4 percent and 4.1 percent, respectively, for the period 
1979-89, the highest among the ten major developed countries. However, for the period 1990-97, the 
corresponding growth rates dropped to 1.0 percent (placing Japan fifth among the ten countries) and 
0.5 percent (the lowest among the ten countries), respectively. On the other hand, Morikawa (2007a), 
using Japanese firm-level data for the period 2000-2004, finds that productivity levels in service 
industries is not significantly lower than those in manufacturing industries, although the dispersion 
in productivity within the former is greater than that in the latter. 
 
8  In contrast, it has been pointed out that for the United States, services industries were the drivers 
of overall productivity growth (see, e.g., Triplett and Bosworth 2006). 
9  Morikawa (2008), for example, argues that in order to improve service sector productivity, the 
diffusion of best practice and greater firm- and industry-level dynamism through firm entry and exit 
is necessary. 
10  In Japan, the Commercial Law prescribes that important matters should be decided by obtaining 
more than two-thirds of the voting rights at a shareholders’ meeting. Therefore, an ownership share 
of 33.4 percent is critical in order to exercise a veto. For this reason, METI also defines 
foreign-owned firms as firms with a foreign ownership ratio of 33.4 percent or more. However, the 
number and share of foreign-owned firms show a similar trend when defining foreign-owned firms 
as firms with 50 percent or more foreign ownership. 
11  In the dataset used for this study, the number of foreign-owned firms in the service sector is only 6 
 
 
INSERT Table 1 
 
Table 2 shows the shares of foreign-owned firms in total employment and in total real value 
added by industry. Reflecting  the fact that foreign-owned firms tend to be larger than 
domestically-owned firms, the employment and value added shares of foreign-owned firms are 
much larger than the share of foreign-owned firms in terms of the number of firms. As for the 
employment share, firms that are 33.4 percent or more foreign-owned account for 5.4 percent of 
employment in all industries, which splits into 7.6 percent for the manufacturing sector and 3.5 
percent  for the service  sector  (Panel (a) of Table 2). As for value added, using the same 
foreign-ownership ratio, share of foreign firms is much larger at 10.0 percent of total value 
added in all industries and 14.5 percent and 5.1 percent in the manufacturing and the service 
sector (Panel (b) of Table 2). The total value added share of foreign firms tends to be larger than 
the employment share in almost all industries, suggesting that foreign firms tend to have higher 
value added per employee, i.e., higher labor productivity. Looking at the trend of foreign-owned 
firms’ share in total employment, the share increased until 2005 but decreased thereafter, which 
is similar to the trend in the number of foreign-owned firms. In the case of value added, the 
overall share steadily increased until 2005, but then remained more or less unchanged. 
 
INSERT Table 2 
 
Thus, although the trends in the share of foreign-owned firms show somewhat different 
patterns across sectors and depending on the  indicator  chosen, it seems safe to say that, 
particularly in terms of value added, the presence of foreign-owned firms increased during the 
period 2000-2007. These observations imply that foreign-owned firms tend to have higher labor 
productivity and a higher growth rate of labor productivity than domestically-owned firms. 
                                                                                                                                                  
slightly larger than that in the manufacturing sector. In fact, however, both in Japan and other 
developed countries, foreign entry is more prominent in the service sector (see, e.g., Directory of 
Foreign-Owned Firms in Japan published by Toyo Keizai Shimposha.). The data used in this paper 
cover only firms with 50 or more employees. Relatively small foreign-owned firms, which are likely 
to be firms in the service sector, are not included in this dataset. Furthermore, in the case of several 
service sectors such as transportation, telecommunication, financial intermediation, insurance, and 
real estate, most of the firms are not covered in the BSBSA. The BSBSA only covers firms in these 
sectors if they have an establishment in a sector administrated by METI. Refer to Ito and Fukao 
(2005) for more comprehensive statistics on foreign-owned firms in Japan.     7 
 
   These conclusions are in line with empirical studies for a variety of countries which show 
that foreign-owned firms tend to outperform domestic firms. For Japan, studies that provide 
evidence to this effect include Fukao et al. (2005) and Kimura and Kiyota (2007). In addition, 
although not shown here to conserve space, the data used in this paper show that foreign-owned 
firms also outperform domestic firms in terms of a range of other performance measures such as 




3. Empirical Methodology 
   The previous section suggested that foreign-owned firms outperform domestic firms both in 
the manufacturing and the service sector. This brings us to the question whether the presence of 
“superior” foreign-owned firms contributes to productivity improvements among 
domestically-owned firms through learning and competition effects. This section presents the 
empirical methodology employed to address this question, that is, to test whether there are 
positive spillovers from foreign-owned to domestically-owned firms. 
   As mentioned at the outset, there are several main channels for such spillover effects, 
including demonstration/imitation effects or spillovers through backward and forward linkages. 
   In this paper, the baseline specification for the relationship between inward FDI and the 
productivity growth of domestically-owned firms is as follows:   
 
∆PRODijt = β0∆FRPRODjt + β1GAPijt−1 + β2FDI sharejt−1 + β3∆MKT shareijt 
                  +μi + γj + ηt + εijt                                  (1) 
 
where  i  indexes domestically-owned firms, j  indexes  industries, and t  indexes years. The 
dependent variable (PROD) is the productivity of domestically-owned firms. FDIshare denotes 
the foreign presence in the industry proxied by the employment share of foreign-owned firms.
13
                                                  
12  The results can be obtained from the author upon request. 
 
In line with the majority of existing studies on the spillover effects of foreign entry, the 
coefficient on  the  FDIshare  variable,  𝗽2,  here is used as an indicator  of the  existence and 
magnitude of spillover effects. Following Haskel et al. (2007), changes in market share 
13  To calculate FDIshare, a firm’s total number of employees is counted as foreign if the sum of the 
share held by foreigners is 33.4 percent or more. The variable FDIshare is calculated as the total 
number of workers employed by foreign-owned firms divided by the total number of employees in 
the industry.   8 
 
(ΔMKTshare) are included in order to measure changes in competitive pressure. As argued, for 
example, by Aitken and Harrison (1999), competition with foreign-owned firms may reduce the 
market shares of domestically-owned firms and force them to operate on a less efficient scale, 
resulting in increases in their average costs and lower productivity. MKTshare is measured as a 
firm’s sales as a proportion of the industry’s total sales. Because the market share variable is 
also affected by technological differences between industries and may not be a good indicator of 
market power, the difference variable (ΔMKTshare) is used for the analysis. This specification 
does not take account of  the heterogeneity in the correlation between inward FDI and the 
productivity growth of domestically-owned firms suggested by Agihon et al. (2009). However, 
following neo-Schumpeterian models of endogenous growth  (e.g.,  Acemoglu  et al. 2006), 
technological distance from the frontier firms in the industry (GAP) is included. The idea is that 
firms lagging behind the technological frontier can improve productivity by adopting advanced 
technologies available in the market. Thus, firms’ productivity growth depends on both the 
ability to catch up towards frontier firms and the ability of frontier firms to innovate. Therefore, 
as a proxy for the innovative ability of frontier firms, the productivity growth of frontier firms 
(ΔFRPROD) is also taken into account. Frontier firms are defined as firms whose productivity 
level is among the top 5 percent in each industry and in each year.
14  The productivity of frontier 
firms is calculated as the average productivity of frontier firms, and the technological distance 
from the frontier is measured as the frontier’s productivity level minus a firm’s productivity 
level (FRPROD –PROD).
15
                                                  
14  The frontier firms include some foreign-owned firms. If the 33.4 percent foreign ownership ratio 
is applied, approximately 8 percent of the frontier firms are foreign-owned, while if the majority 
foreign ownership definition is applied, approximately 5 percent of the frontier firms are 
foreign-owned. The frontier productivity growth indicates the growth potential of each industry and 
it seems reasonable to include foreign-owned firms among the frontier firms. However, the variable 
FPROD proxies the productivity growth rate of foreign-owned firms when the frontier firms consist 
largely of foreign-owned firms. Estimation using the FPROD  variable calculated excluding 
foreign-owned firms produces almost the same results as when using the FPROD variable calculated 
including foreign-owned firms. 
  Both FRPROD and GAP are expected to take a positive coefficient. 
Both TFP and labor productivity are used for the productivity variables PROD and FRPROD, 
and the productivity measures are in logarithm. μi, γj, and ηt are fixed effects for firms, industries, 
and years, respectively. εijt is the error term. Firm fixed effects (μi) are included to capture 
unobserved firm heterogeneity related to firm location, size, the sub-industry of operation, 
managers’ characteristics, firm age, etc. 




4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Baseline results 
    The  estimation results of the baseline specification (1)  are shown in Table 3.  For the 
baseline estimation, the one-year difference of the productivity and market share variables is 
used. In order to take endogeneity into account, the FDIshare and GAP variables are lagged by 
one year. The results of the TFP specification are presented in panel (a), while the results of the 
labor productivity specification are presented in panel (b). In both panels, columns (1) – (3) 
present the OLS results without firm fixed effects, and columns (4) – (5) present the panel 
fixed-effect estimation results taking firm fixed effects into account.   
The results in Table 3 suggest that the FDI spillover effects are negative in many cases 
when firm fixed effects are controlled for, while the FDI spillover effects tend to be positive 
when firm fixed effects are not controlled for. These results suggest that only firms which 
potentially realize higher productivity growth because of firm specific characteristics enjoy 
positive spillovers from foreign-owned firms in the same industry. 
 
INSERT Table 3 
 
4.2 Heterogeneity of the effects of FDI   
The estimation results for the baseline specification indicate that whether 
domestically-owned firms enjoy positive spillover effects appears to depend on firm specific 
characteristics. In order to take this heterogeneity in the correlation between inward FDI and the 
productivity growth of domestically-owned firms into account, the baseline specification is 
modified as follows:   
 
<Modified specification 1> 
∆PRODijt = β0∆FRPRODjt + β1GAPijt−1 + β2FDI sharejt−1 + β3∆MKT shareijt 
                   +β4CATCHijt ∙ FDIsharejt−1 + β5CATCHijt + μi + γj + ηt + εijt   
                                                                       (2) 
<Modified specification 2> 10 
 
∆PRODijt = β0∆FRPRODjt + β1GAPijt−1 + β2FDI sharejt−1 + β3∆MKT shareijt 
                   +β4GAPijt−1 ∙ FDIsharejt−1 + μi + γj + ηt + εijt            (3) 
 
The variable CATCH is a dummy variable which takes one for catch-up firms and zero 
otherwise. Catch-up firms are defined as firms that reduced the gap with the frontier during the 
preceding year.
16
   Table 4 shows the fixed effect estimation results of the modified specifications 1 and 2. As 
for catch-up firms, they enjoy positive FDI spillovers and the effect is statistically significant in 
all cases (columns 1–3 in both panels). On the other hand, the interaction term of technological 
distance and FDI does not have a statistically significant coefficient in most cases (columns 4–5 
  That is, firms that reduced the distance to the frontier from year t-1 to year t 
are defined as catch-up firms in year t. The modified specification 1 (equation 2) is estimated in 
order to examine whether catch-up firms enjoy positive spillovers. On the other hand, Aghion et 
al. (2009) argue that the  threat from frontier entrants leads  incumbents in sectors that are 
initially close to the technology frontier to innovate more, and this triggers productivity growth. 
In sectors close to the frontier, incumbent firms know that they can escape and survive entry by 
innovating successfully, and so they react with more intensive innovation activities. However, in 
sectors further from the frontier, the entry threat reduces the expected rents from conducting 
R&D for incumbent firms, because incumbents have no hope to win against an entrant. 
Therefore, the FDI spillover effect is heterogeneous across sectors and firms, depending on the 
distance from the technology frontier.  To incorporate Aghion et al.’s (2009) argument, the 
modified specification 2 (equation 3) includes an interaction term of the GAP and FDIshare 
variables. However, in contrast with Aghion et al. (2009), who test for heterogeneity across 
industries and consider the distance to the world technological frontier by industry, assuming 
that U.S. industries represent the world technological frontier, this paper considers each firm’s 
technological distance to the national frontier in each industry  (GAP)  instead of the 
industry-level technological distance to the world frontier. In addition to data constraints, the 
reason is that this paper focuses on the heterogeneity of FDI spillover effects across firms within 
an industry. Based on Aghion et al. (2009), firms closer to the national frontier may be expected 
to be more actively engaged in innovative activities and more likely to enjoy positive FDI 
spillovers as a result than firms further from the frontier. 
                                                  
16  The definition of catch-up firms here follows Arnold et al. (2008). 11 
 
in both panels). The only exception is the TFP specification for the service sector (column 6 of 
panel a). In this case, only firms closer to the technological frontier can enjoy positive FDI 
spillovers, which is consistent with the results obtained by Aghion et al. (2009). However, this 
does not apply to all other cases, so that the evidence on whether firms closer to the 
technological frontier enjoy positive spillover effects is not conclusive. 
   As for other explanatory variables, both the variable for frontier productivity growth 
(FRPROD) and that for technological distance from the frontier (GAP) have a positive and 
significant coefficient, as expected. The market share variable (MKTshare) also has a positive 





INSERT Table 4 
 
4.3 Robustness checks   
Estimating the relationship between foreign entry and the productivity of domestic firms 
raises a number of important econometric issues concerning the possible endogeneity of FDI 
and the direction of causality. That is, although a considerable number of studies have found a 
significant correlation between firm productivity and foreign entry, changes in the presence of 
foreign firms may be endogenous to shocks to firm productivity. Moreover, it is often difficult 
to determine the direction of causality between the presence of foreign firms and productivity. 
That is, foreign firms may be attracted to industries with high productivity growth. Alternatively, 
foreign firms may enter industries with low productivity growth in order to reap greater gains 
from their competitive advantage. Several previous empirical studies address these issues, for 
example by employing an instrumental variable (IV) regression approach (e.g., Haskel et al. 
2007, Aghion et al. 2009, Vahter 2010) and/or by employing longer time lags (e.g., Haskel et al. 
                                                  
17  Supplementary  analysis of extensions of the models above that include various measures of 
industry-level competition, such as the Herfindahl index (calculated by industry using the firm-level 
dataset), the import penetration ratio (calculated using the JIP Database 2009), and regulation 
weights (taken from the JIP Database) show that the Herfindahl index tends to be negatively 
correlated with firm productivity, suggesting that competition promotes productivity growth. 
However, the import penetration ratio is negatively associated with firm productivity growth, while 
the regulation weight is positively associated with firm productivity growth, suggesting that 
competition restrains firm productivity growth. Although it is difficult to obtain a conclusive result 
regarding market competition effects on firm productivity, the estimated coefficients on the FDI 
variable are mostly consistent. 12 
 
2007). Because suitable instruments are not readily available, the approach taken here to check 
the robustness of the results is to use longer time lags.
18
    In the baseline estimation and the modified estimations presented above, one-year lagged 
values  of  the variables representing foreign presence are used instead of contemporaneous 
values in order to address the endogeneity issue. However, for robustness checks, the same 
models (equations 1, 2, and 3) using a longer time lag are estimated to take account of the 
possibility that foreign presence may be correlated with productivity shocks in the near future. 
Moreover,  longer  lags may be more appropriate if spillovers take time to materialize.  The 
baseline results when  taking three-year differences  and using three-year lagged values for 
foreign presence are presented in Table 5. The modified specifications are also estimated with 
three-year differences and lagged values and the results are shown in Table 6. The results in 
Table 5 are very similar to those in Table 3, confirming that FDI spillover effects are negative 
once firm fixed effects are controlled for. The results in columns (1)–(3) in Table 6 are also 
consistent with those in columns (1)–(3) in Table 4, suggesting that only catch-up firms enjoy 
positive FDI spillovers. Moreover, these results suggest that negative spillover effects are larger 
in the service sector than in the manufacturing sector.   
   
   On the other hand, as for technological distance and FDI effects, the results in Table 6 are 
not consistent with those in Table 4. Columns (4)–(6) in Table 6 show that firms further from the 
frontier enjoy positive FDI spillovers, particularly in the case of the manufacturing sector. This 
result is at odds with Aghion et al. (2009) and suggests that, in the long run, firms further from 
the frontier may be able to improve productivity by adopting advanced technology 
demonstrated by foreign-owned firms. Such demonstration and imitation effects may be larger 
for firms lagging further behind than firms close to the frontier. However, in the case of the 
service  sector, the interaction term of technological distance and FDI does not have a 
statistically significant coefficient and the overall effects of foreign presence are still negative. 
 
                                                  
18  Possible candidates for an instrument may include inward FDI in the United States or indicators 
of regulation. However, there are several difficulties in employing these variables as instruments. For 
example, inward FDI in the United States is not highly correlated with inward FDI in Japan, 
suggesting that the inward FDI in the United States may not work well as an instrument. In addition, 
although  an instrumental  variable should be correlated with foreign entry but not with the 
productivity of domestic firms, it is extremely difficult to find a proxy for regulations which only 
affect foreign entry  and does not affect productivity of domestic firms. Nevertheless, although 
employing an IV approach presents considerable difficulties, doing so in the future would be a 
worthwhile exercise. 13 
 
INSERT Tables 5 & 6 
 
   Finally, as another robustness check, it is examined whether the results depend on how 
foreign-owned firms are defined, since this is not a straightforward matter. In the analyses so far, 
foreign-owned firms were defined as firms with 33.4 percent or more foreign ownership 
following the official Japanese government definition, and therefore, firms in which foreign 
portfolio investment exceeds this threshold are included as foreign-owned firm.
19  In order to 
exclude such cases as much as possible, equations (1)–(3) above are estimated using a new 
FDIshare variable which is calculated based on the majority ownership definition (50 percent or 
more foreign ownership).




4.4 Further discussion and interpretation of the results 
   The analysis in this paper suggests that FDI spillover effects on the productivity growth of 
domestically-owned firms are negative. Negative FDI spillovers are possible when the presence 
of foreign-owned firms causes significant losses in the market shares of domestically-owned 
firms and prevents the latter from operating on an efficient scale. The analysis here, however, 
indicates that FDI spillovers are negative even after controlling for changes in market shares. 
Possible explanations include the following. First, an increase in the presence of foreign-owned 
firms  may  increase demand for highly-skilled workers and  reduce  the ability of 
domestically-owned firms to attract highly-skilled workers. As a result, the quality of labor at 
domestically-owned firms may decline and their productivity growth deteriorate.  Second, 
competition with foreign-owned firms may promote product diversification and/or product 
switching at domestically-owned firms. Although in the analysis here firms’ sales and purchases 
are deflated using industry-level price deflators, the industry of a firm is defined by the product 
making up the largest share of sales. Therefore, the effects of product diversification and/or 
                                                  
19  It should be noted, though, that in Japan (as in many other countries), a substantial share of the 
stocks issued by listed firms is owned by foreign institutional investors in the form of portfolio 
investment. 
20  Definitions of foreign-owned firms in official statistics vary across countries. For example, in the 
United States, foreign-owned firms are defined as firms with 10 percent or more ownership by a 
single foreigner or foreign firm, while in Japan foreign-owned firms are defined as firms with 33.4 
percent or more ownership by one or several foreigners. In some countries, firms are considered as 
foreign-owned for any foreign ownership share, or for ownership shares of at least 5 percent or 10 
percent. However, the majority ownership definition is widely employed worldwide. 
21  The results are shown in Appendix Tables 3–6.   14 
 
product switching on firm productivity are not fully captured. Third, domestically-owned firms 
may react to greater competition with excessive levels of investment in order to retain their 
market share, resulting in lower productivity. The results of this paper suggest that negative FDI 
spillover effects are particularly large in the case of service sector firms. If firms facing greater 
competition  increase investment such as ICT (information and communication technology) 
investment  and job training for workers in order to improve the quality of services, their 
productivity level should in theory also improve. However, it is extremely difficult to measure 
service quality and to calculate productivity reflecting quality changes.
22
    While the results suggest that the overall spillover effects of inward FDI are negative, they 
tend to be positive for firms with high productivity growth. This suggests that the presence of 
foreign  competitors  is  favorable for such firms and helps  them  to  further improve their 
productivity. Moreover, some of the estimation  results indicate that, in the case of the 
manufacturing sector, foreign entry tends to accelerate productivity growth for firms lagging 
behind the technological frontier in the long run, suggesting that learning effects from advanced 
foreign-owned firms do exist. If foreign entry accelerates productivity catch-up, then it is likely 
to contribute to long-run economic growth by affecting firm dynamics. However, it should be 
noted that the overall effect of inward FDI is still negative and it is therefore necessary to 
examine what factors contribute to FDI spillovers being positive.   
   
   Previous studies such as Javorcik (2004), Javorcik et al. (2004), and Barrios et al. (2009) 
focus on inter-industry linkages. Although  examining  the  role of inter-industry linkages is 
beyond the scope of this study, it seems likely that both intra- and inter-industry transaction 
relationships among firms are important channels of technology diffusion. That in the analysis 
here the magnitude of negative FDI spillover effects was found to be larger for services than 
manufacturing  firms  may reflect the fact that service  firms tend to have fewer  transaction 
relationships with other firms, especially when compared with firms in assembly-type industries 
such as the automobile, electronics, and machinery industries. In fact, the service sector has a 
higher value-added to output ratio than the manufacturing sector, suggesting that the service 
sector uses less intermediate inputs than the manufacturing sector and has fewer intra- and 
inter-industry transaction relationships.
23
                                                  
22  For a more detailed discussion of the various problems involved in the measurement of 
productivity in services see, for example, Hartwig (2008) and Inklaar et al. (2008).   
  This suggests that services  firms have less 
23  Based on the firm-level panel data used in this study, the value-added to output ratio is 28 15 
 
opportunity to receive spillovers from upstream firms. Moreover, a large part of total demand in 
the service sector is final demand, while in the manufacturing sector it is intermediate demand.
24
   Finally, even though foreign entry does not have a positive effect on domestically-owned 
firms’ productivity growth, it may nevertheless affect their behavior. Vahter (2010), analyzing 
Estonian firm-level data employing a specification à la Aghion et al. (2009), concludes that 
although FDI entry does not have a significant short-term effect on productivity growth, it is 
positively associated with process innovation at domestically-owned firms. For Japanese firms, 
Todo (2006) found a positive association between the R&D stock of foreign-owned firms and 
the productivity of domestically-owned firms, while there was no such association in the case of 
the capital stock of foreign-owned firms, suggesting that foreign-owned firms’ knowledge spills 
over through their R&D activities. These results imply that FDI spillovers are closely associated 
with knowledge flows to domestically-owned firms, and positive FDI spillovers may be seen 
explicitly if focusing on knowledge flows instead of just looking at foreign penetration in terms 
of employment or sales. Although knowledge flows from foreign-owned to domestically-owned 
firms are an interesting issue for future research, defining knowledge flows would be extremely 
difficult for service sectors. 
 
These relatively limited forward and backward linkages with other firms may prevent service 
sector firms from absorbing advanced technology or know-how from foreign-owned firms. 
    
5. Conclusion 
   This paper examined the FDI spillover effects on productivity growth of domestic firms, 
using a large-scale Japanese firm-level dataset which covers a large number of service sector 
firms.  The analysis was motivated by the fact that although FDI in the service sector is a 
potentially important channel of international technology diffusion –  especially given that 
services are often difficult to trade – there has been little empirical research on the effects of 
such FDI. Yet, such research is essential for a better understanding of FDI spillovers and the 
formulation of economic and industrial policies.   
                                                                                                                                                  
percent for manufacturing firms, while it is 46 percent for services firms. The industry-level data 
from the 2005 Input-Output Tables show similar figures. At the aggregated level, the gross 
value-added to domestic output ratio is approximately 30 percent for the manufacturing sector and 
approximately 60 percent for the service sector. 
24  For example, according to the 2005 Input-Output Tables, the share of final demand in total 
demand is 44 percent for the manufacturing sector while the corresponding figure for the service 
sector is 58 percent. 16 
 
   The analysis found no evidence of positive FDI spillover effects on the productivity growth 
of domestically-owned firms. In fact, the results suggest that the presence of foreign-owned 
firms tends to be negatively associated with the productivity growth of domestically-owned 
firms, both in the manufacturing and the service sector. However, the magnitude of the negative 
effect is larger in the case of the service  sector, implying that FDI spillover effects  are 
heterogeneous across sectors and  depend on the  characteristics of sectors.  Various  possible 
sources  for  the heterogeneity were  discussed, and these sources deserve further scrutiny in 
future research. 
While the results suggest that the overall spillover effects of FDI are negative, they tend to 
be positive for firms with high productivity growth. This finding implies that foreign entry 
potentially raises industry- or macro-level productivity if firms with low productivity growth 
potential  are forced to exit from the  market.  Alternatively, the results suggest that to raise 
industry- or macro-level productivity growth, a policy scheme to encourage less productive 
firms to improve their productivity should be introduced along with the promotion of inward 
FDI. On the other hand, in the case of the manufacturing sector, in the long run, firms lagging 
behind the technological frontier are found to be more likely  to  see an improvement in 
productivity through learning from foreign-owned firms. These results imply that foreign entry 
possibly contributes to long-run economic growth by affecting firm dynamics. However, the 
overall effect of inward FDI is still negative and further investigation on factors which lead to 
positive FDI spillovers are desirable.   
   Lastly, some limitations of this study and remaining issues should mentioned. First, although 
it is difficult to solve the endogeneity problem mentioned in Section 4, further robustness 
checks of the estimation results are necessary. Second, as mentioned in Section 2, the coverage 
of the BSBSA is not sufficiently large, particularly in the case of the service sector and for 
small-sized firms. Given the importance of the potential effects of foreign entry in the service 
sector, expanding the industries and firms surveyed and further empirical studies using such an 
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Appendix: Variable construction and data sources 
 
Output: Except for the commerce sector, gross output is defined as firms’ total sales. For the 
commerce sector, gross output is measured as sales minus expenses for purchased materials. 
Gross output is deflated by the output deflator taken from the JIP Database 2009 for years 2000 
to 2006. For 2007, the output deflator was extrapolated using the growth rate of various price 
indexes from 2006 to 2007 published by the Bank of Japan. The output price index was used for 
manufacturing industries, and the corporate service price index was used for service industries. 
 
Intermediate inputs: For the commerce sector, intermediate inputs are calculated as (Cost of 
sales + Operating costs) – (Wages + Depreciation costs + Expenses for purchased materials). 
The intermediate inputs of other sectors are defined as (Cost of sales + Operating costs) – 
(Wages + Depreciation costs). Intermediate inputs are deflated by the intermediate input deflator 
taken from the JIP Database 2009 for years 2000 to 2006. For 2007, the intermediate input 
deflator was extrapolated using the growth rate of various price indexes from 2006 to 2007 
published by the Bank of Japan. The input price index was used for manufacturing industries. 
For service industries, the intermediate input deflator for 2007 was calculated using the output 
deflator and the 2006 JIP Input-Output Table.   
 
Labor input: Labor input is calculated as each firm’s total number of workers multiplied by the 
sector’s working hours taken from the JIP Database 2009 for years 2000 to 2006. For 2007, the 
data on working hours by sector are extrapolated using the growth rate of working hours from 
2006 to 2007 taken from the Monthly Labor Survey published by Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare.   
 
Capital Stock: For capital stock, the only data available are the nominal book values of tangible 
fixed assets. Using these data, the net capital stock of firm i in industry j in constant 2000 prices 
is calculated as follows: 
  ) / ( jt jt it it IBV INK BV K ∗ =  
where BVit represents the book value of firm i’s tangible fixed assets in year t, INKjt stands for 
the net capital stock of industry j in constant 2000 prices, and IBVjt denotes the book value of 21 
 
industry j’s capital. INKjt is calculated as follows. First, the data on the book value of tangible 
fixed  assets in 1975 from the Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations published by 
Ministry of Finance  were  taken as a benchmark.  Then,  the book value of year 1975 was 
converted into the real value in constant 2000 prices using the investment deflator taken from 
the JIP Database 2009. Second, the net capital stock of industry j, INKjt, for succeeding years 
was calculated using the perpetual inventory method. The sectoral depreciation rate used was 
taken from the JIP Database 2009. Table 1. Number of foreign-owned firms
(Upper row: No. of firms; Lower row: %)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2000-07
average
1-48 All industries 407 441 450 437 533 560 494 466 474
(1.74) (1.85) (1.93) (1.93) (2.22) (2.38) (2.08) (1.88) (2.00)
1-30 Manufacturing 202 222 213 230 266 264 243 235 234
(1.76) (1.93) (1.90) (2.13) (2.31) (2.33) (2.18) (2.02) (2.07)
33-48 Services 205 219 236 206 267 296 250 231 239
(1.74) (1.79) (1.96) (1.75) (2.15) (2.43) (2.00) (1.77) (1.95)
37 141 149 151 131 158 171 142 124 146
(2.68) (2.89) (3.02) (2.72) (3.18) (3.53) (3.01) (2.56) (2.95)
38 23 22 27 21 33 39 32 32 29
(0.79) (0.73) (0.94) (0.75) (1.12) (1.33) (1.11) (1.07) (0.98)
40-42 11 15 17 17 25 28 21 22 20
(1.41) (1.67) (1.80) (1.66) (2.20) (2.35) (1.76) (1.70) (1.84)
44 27 28 33 26 31 35 33 27 30
(2.12) (2.06) (2.37) (1.89) (2.01) (2.37) (2.25) (1.67) (2.08)







Retail tradeTable 2. Share of foreign-owned firms in total employment and in total value added
(a) Share in employment (33.4 % or more foreign-owned) (%)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
2000-07
average
1-48 All industries 3.56 3.81 4.20 6.11 6.31 6.77 6.09 5.69 5.36
1-30 Manufacturing 5.59 6.01 5.44 8.82 9.05 9.06 8.99 7.88 7.60
33-48 Services 1.56 1.76 3.14 3.79 4.07 4.94 3.96 4.06 3.49
37 Wholesale
trade
2.82 3.21 3.57 3.04 3.52 4.31 3.61 4.85 3.61








3.27 3.88 5.23 7.06 5.35 5.59 6.46 4.65 5.25
(b) Share in total value added (33.4% or more foreign-owned) （%）
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
2000-07
average
1-48 All industries 5.16 6.15 5.52 10.00 10.97 12.89 12.19 12.90 10.02
1-30 Manufacturing 7.64 9.04 6.45 14.55 15.20 18.39 19.27 18.24 14.52
33-48 Services 2.22 3.17 4.64 5.23 6.38 7.08 4.38 6.01 5.08
37 Wholesale
trade
5.21 5.14 5.29 5.00 5.94 7.99 7.43 10.31 6.51








4.16 4.60 10.88 12.00 10.53 10.59 13.45 11.59 9.95Table 3. Estimation results
(a) Dependent variable: TFP growth ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d.FRPRODjt 0.862*** 0.880*** 0.815*** 0.952*** 0.960*** 0.923***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
GAPijt-1 0.169*** 0.174*** 0.162*** 0.788*** 0.767*** 0.816***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.008)
FDI sharejt-1 0.941*** 1.155*** 0.659*** -0.130*** 0.039 -0.256***
(0.139) (0.179) (0.199) (0.046) (0.060) (0.062)
d.MKTshareijt 6.391*** 6.456*** 6.630*** 3.827*** 4.051*** 4.032***
(1.086) (2.069) (1.255) (0.860) (1.315) (0.697)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 142,136 69,570 72,566 142,136 69,570 72,566
F statistic 269.9 699.8 89.0 3344.3 4961.6 1359.7
R-squared 0.795 0.855 0.647 0.881 0.905 0.757
(b) Dependent variable: Labor productivity growth ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d.FRPRODjt 0.343*** 0.381*** 0.323*** 0.705*** 0.728*** 0.710***
(0.014) (0.024) (0.019) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011)
GAPijt-1 0.192*** 0.196*** 0.187*** 0.742*** 0.736*** 0.763***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009)
FDI sharejt-1 0.091 0.221* -0.088 -0.267*** -0.166*** -0.247***
(0.092) (0.118) (0.110) (0.044) (0.056) (0.061)
d.MKTshareijt 2.424*** 3.744*** 1.811*** 1.538*** 2.737*** 1.181***
(0.445) (1.133) (0.442) (0.396) (0.784) (0.374)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 142,515 69,595 72,581 142,515 69,595 72,581
F statistic 31.3 34.9 35.1 180.8 171.1 180.9
R-squared 0.141 0.144 0.138 0.407 0.408 0.408
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered within a sector and year for equations (1)-(3)) are
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.Table 4. FDI spillovers and catch-up firms
(a) Dependent variable: TFP growth ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d.FRPRODjt 0.956*** 0.963*** 0.934*** 0.952*** 0.960*** 0.923***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
GAPijt-1 0.620*** 0.601*** 0.646*** 0.790*** 0.758*** 0.832***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009)
FDI sharejt-1 -0.229*** 0.006 -0.556*** -0.081 -0.129 0.371**
(0.049) (0.063) (0.067) (0.096) (0.117) (0.161)
CATCHijt-1*FDI sharejt-1 0.434*** 0.385*** 0.509***
(0.042) (0.049) (0.062)
CATCHijt-1 0.252*** 0.262*** 0.235***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
GAPijt-1*FDI sharejt-1 -0.025 0.082 -0.401***
(0.054) (0.062) (0.107)
d.MKTshareijt 3.201*** 3.160*** 3.498*** 3.821*** 4.108*** 4.040***
(0.707) (1.068) (0.616) (0.860) (1.321) (0.704)
Observations 142,136 69,570 72,566 142,136 69,570 72,566
F statistic 3611.1 5022.1 1630.3 3298.0 4867.5 1333.5
R-squared 0.905 0.924 0.805 0.881 0.905 0.758
(b) Dependent variable: Labor productivity growth ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d.FRPRODjt 0.760*** 0.791*** 0.757*** 0.704*** 0.725*** 0.710***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011)
GAPijt-1 0.585*** 0.574*** 0.605*** 0.749*** 0.742*** 0.765***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010)
FDI sharejt-1 -0.329*** -0.150** -0.499*** -0.107 -0.058 -0.161
(0.048) (0.060) (0.068) (0.095) (0.116) (0.135)
CATCHijt-1*FDI sharejt-1 0.342*** 0.319*** 0.422***
(0.041) (0.048) (0.067)
CATCHijt-1 0.260*** 0.263*** 0.251***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
GAPijt-1*FDI sharejt-1 -0.097 -0.064 -0.066
(0.063) (0.074) (0.105)
d.MKTshareijt 1.096*** 1.935*** 0.823** 1.525*** 2.707*** 1.183***
(0.339) (0.677) (0.334) (0.396) (0.782) (0.375)
Observations 142,515 69,595 72,581 142,515 69,595 72,581
F statistic 607.6 661.7 478.3 182.5 168.6 177.2
R-squared 0.524 0.523 0.525 0.407 0.408 0.408
Notes: Firm fixed effects are controlled for. Year and industry dummies are included. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively.Table 5. Estimation results (3-year lagged)
(a) Dependent variable: lnTFPijt - lnTFPijt-3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d3.FRPRODjt 0.880*** 0.894*** 0.839*** 0.990*** 1.003*** 0.957***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
GAPijt-3 0.246*** 0.259*** 0.231*** 1.053*** 1.088*** 1.002***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009)
FDI sharejt-3 1.037*** 1.282*** 0.592* -0.329*** -0.110 -0.748***
(0.175) (0.200) (0.339) (0.059) (0.075) (0.082)
d3.MKTshareijt 5.307*** 6.261*** 5.169*** 2.932*** 2.739*** 3.465***
(1.007) (1.678) (1.228) (0.652) (1.008) (0.465)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 91,385 45,602 45,783 91,385 45,602 45,783
F statistic 432.3 1137.8 119.9 3624.2 5803.7 1288.0
R-squared 0.826 0.874 0.689 0.92 0.939 0.8
(b) Dependent variable: lnLPijt - lnLPijt-3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d3.FRPRODjt 0.372*** 0.396*** 0.349*** 0.862*** 0.895*** 0.828***
(0.014) (0.028) (0.016) (0.010) (0.017) (0.013)
GAPijt-3 0.281*** 0.288*** 0.272*** 1.023*** 1.066*** 0.972***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.016) (0.011)
FDI sharejt-3 0.048 0.181 -0.216 -0.236*** -0.075 -0.478***
(0.103) (0.126) (0.146) (0.057) (0.071) (0.079)
d3.MKTshareijt 2.191*** 3.076*** 1.599*** 1.152*** 2.012*** 1.237***
(0.454) (0.960) (0.534) (0.341) (0.599) (0.354)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 91,644 45,643 45,801 91,644 45,643 45,801
F statistic 73.31 69.57 101.9 264.2 277.7 240.6
R-squared 0.248 0.246 0.228 0.543 0.572 0.504
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered within a sector and year for equations (1)-
(3)) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.Table 6. FDI spillovers and catch-up firms (3-year lagged)
(a) Dependent variable: lnTFPijt - lnTFPijt-3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d3.FRPRODjt 0.988*** 0.998*** 0.962*** 0.990*** 1.003*** 0.958***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
GAPijt-3 0.866*** 0.900*** 0.819*** 1.039*** 1.073*** 0.999***
(0.012) (0.021) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009)
FDI sharejt-3 -0.530*** -0.257*** -1.083*** -0.738*** -0.427*** -0.900***
(0.064) (0.079) (0.095) (0.111) (0.126) (0.184)
CATCHijt-3*FDI sharejt-3 0.717*** 0.572*** 1.015***
(0.065) (0.075) (0.099)
CATCHijt-3 0.239*** 0.241*** 0.230***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
GAPijt-3*FDI sharejt-3 0.222*** 0.162*** 0.100
(0.060) (0.063) (0.111)
d3.MKTshareijt 2.656*** 2.408*** 3.166*** 2.961*** 2.807*** 3.466***
(0.587) (0.933) (0.409) (0.653) (1.018) (0.463)
Observations 91,385 45,602 45,783 91,385 45,602 45,783
F statistic 4001.5 6234.5 1529.2 3579.1 5631.2 1268.4
R-squared 0.932 0.947 0.833 0.920 0.939 0.800
(b) Dependent variable: lnLPijt - lnLPijt-3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d3.FRPRODjt 0.884*** 0.910*** 0.856*** 0.865*** 0.900*** 0.829***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.017) (0.014)
GAPijt-3 0.837*** 0.877*** 0.794*** 1.010*** 1.052*** 0.967***
(0.013) (0.022) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011)
FDI sharejt-3 -0.399*** -0.253*** -0.629*** -0.614*** -0.355*** -0.696***
(0.062) (0.077) (0.087) (0.116) (0.132) (0.177)
CATCHijt-3*FDI sharejt-3 0.614*** 0.557*** 0.753***
(0.064) (0.073) (0.101)
CATCHijt-3 0.255*** 0.245*** 0.255***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
GAPijt-3*FDI sharejt-3 0.244*** 0.172** 0.170
(0.076) (0.080) (0.132)
d3.MKTshareijt 0.861*** 1.479*** 0.983*** 1.169*** 2.062*** 1.235***
(0.312) (0.561) (0.311) (0.341) (0.604) (0.354)
Observations 91,644 45,643 45,801 91,644 45,643 45,801
F statistic 506.3 578.0 375.2 293.4 312.4 242.6
R-squared 0.614 0.631 0.589 0.543 0.572 0.504
Notes: Firm fixed effects are controlled. Year and industry dummies are included. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are in parentheses, with ***, **, and * indicating significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.Appendix Table 1.　List of industries
JIP2006
1-48 All industries 1-108
1-30 Manufacturing 8-59
1 Food products and beverages 8-13
2 Textiles 15
3 Lumber and wood products 16, 17
4 Pulp, paper, and paper products 18-19
5 Printing 20
6 Chemicals and chemical fibers 23-27
7 Paint, coating, and grease 28
8 Pharmaceutical products 29
9 Miscellaneous chemical products 28
10 Petroleum and coal products 30,31
11 Plastic products 58
12 Rubber products 22
13 Ceramic, stone and clay products 32-35
14 Iron and steel 36,37
15 Non-ferrous metals 38,39
16 Fabricated metal products 40,41
17 Metal processing machinery 42
18 Special industry machinery  43
19 Office and service industry machines 45
20 Miscellaneous machinery 44
21 Electrical machinery and apparatus 46
22 Household electric appliances 47
23 Communication equipment 49
24 Computer and electronic equipment 48,50
25 Electronic parts and devices 51,52
26 Miscellaneous electrical machinery 53
27 Motor vehicles and parts 54,55
28 Other transportation equipment 56
29 Precision machinery 57
30 Miscellaneous mfg. industries 21, 59
33-48 Services 60-107
33 Construction 60
34 Electricity, gas, and water supply 62,63,64
35 Transport and storage 74,77
36 Telecommunications and broadcasting 78,79,90
37 Wholesale trade 67
3701 General merchandise
3702 Textile products
3703 Apparel accessories and notions
3704 Agricultural, animal and poultry farm and aquatic products
3705 Food and beverages
3706 Building materials
3707 Chemicals and related products
3708 Minerals and metals
3709 General machinery and equipment
3710 Motor vehicles
3711 Electrical machinery
3712 Miscellaneous machinery and equipment
3713 Fixtures and house furnishings
3714 Drugs and toiletries
3715 Other products
38 Retail trade 68
3801 General merchandise
3802 Dry goods, apparel, and apparel accessories
3803 Food and beverages
3804 Motor vehicles and bicycles3805 Furniture, fixture, and household utensil
3806 Appliance stores
3807 Drugs and toiletry stores
3808 Fuel stores
3809 Stores, n.e.c.
39 Financial intermediation and real estate 69,71
40 Advertising 85
41 Rental of office equipment and goods 86
42 Other business services 87,88
43 Entertainment 89
44 Information services 91,92,93
4401 Information services and internet-based services 91
4402 Computer programming 91
4403 Motion pictures 92,93
45 Eating and drinking places 94
46 Accommodation 95
47 Personal services 96,97
48 Services, n.e.c. 66,80,81,82,84
31 Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 1,2,5,6
32 Mining and quarrying 7Appendix Table 2. Number of observations by industry and year
(Number of firms)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2000-07
average
1-48 All industries 23,324 23,803 23,308 22,607 23,995 23,549 23,703 24,738 23,628
1-30 Manufacturing 11,478 11,478 11,225 10,815 11,502 11,315 11,161 11,661 11,329
33-48 Services 11,782 12,258 12,024 11,738 12,447 12,185 12,494 13,031 12,245




103 101 103 105 113 109 111 121 108
35 Transport and
storage





12 22 29 51 58 61 76 57 46
37 Wholesale trade 5,268 5,163 5,006 4,816 4,961 4,844 4,714 4,849 4,953
38 Retail trade 2,906 3,014 2,882 2,783 2,959 2,940 2,874 2,995 2,919
39 Financial
intermediation
114 129 124 123 129 131 124 129 125









415 531 559 626 700 750 729 814 641








324 394 404 402 439 406 415 472 407
46 Accommodation 23 46 47 49 49 55 54 52 47
47 Personal services 124 168 148 161 162 149 449 484 231









56 54 43 38 34 33 33 33 41Appendix Table 3. Estimation results (Based on the majority ownership definition)
(a) Dependent variable: TFP growth ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d.FRPRODjt 0.857*** 0.871*** 0.817*** 0.952*** 0.959*** 0.923***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
GAPijt-1 0.170*** 0.178*** 0.162*** 0.787*** 0.768*** 0.815***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
FDI sharejt-1 0.247 0.254 0.299 0.001 -0.076 -0.037
(0.169) (0.253) (0.211) (0.067) (0.122) (0.074)
d.MKTshareijt 6.486*** 6.766*** 6.614*** 3.739*** 3.898*** 3.992***
(1.031) (1.926) (1.211) (0.797) (1.139) (0.673)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 143,058 70,224 72,834 143,058 70,224 72,834
F statistic 232.9 442.5 89.82 3332.2 4866.4 1365.4
R-squared 0.793 0.852 0.645 0.881 0.905 0.756
(b) Dependent variable: Labor productivity growth ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d.FRPRODjt 0.339*** 0.362*** 0.324*** 0.710*** 0.733*** 0.711***
(0.014) (0.024) (0.018) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011)
GAPijt-1 0.192*** 0.195*** 0.188*** 0.741*** 0.734*** 0.764***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009)
FDI sharejt-1 -0.007 0.030 0.107 0.182*** 0.293** 0.053
(0.123) (0.250) (0.110) (0.067) (0.118) (0.078)
d.MKTshareijt 2.443*** 3.717*** 1.851*** 1.504*** 2.632*** 1.179***
(0.430) (1.035) (0.435) (0.377) (0.694) (0.367)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 143,441 70,251 72,849 143,441 70,251 72,849
F statistic 31.12 32.6 35.75 183.2 175.7 182.2
R-squared 0.14 0.141 0.138 0.406 0.407 0.408
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered within a sector and year for equations (1)-(3)) are
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.Appendix Table 4. FDI spillovers and catch-up firms (Based on the majority ownership definition)
(a) Dependent variable: TFP growth ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d.FRPRODjt 0.956*** 0.961*** 0.934*** 0.952*** 0.959*** 0.923***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
GAPijt-1 0.621*** 0.607*** 0.646*** 0.788*** 0.773*** 0.813***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.008)
FDI sharejt-1 -0.073 0.064 -0.242*** 0.124 0.333 -0.172
(0.072) (0.121) (0.086) (0.152) (0.259) (0.169)
CATCHijt-1*FDI sharejt-1 0.293*** 0.313*** 0.349***
(0.062) (0.102) (0.077)
CATCHijt-1 0.264*** 0.276*** 0.244***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
GAPijt-1*FDI sharejt-1 -0.081 -0.266 0.089
(0.100) (0.170) (0.112)
d.MKTshareijt 3.155*** 3.124*** 3.490*** 3.736*** 3.883*** 3.995***
(0.665) (0.942) (0.602) (0.796) (1.135) (0.673)
Observations 143,058 70,224 72,834 143,058 70,224 72,834
F statistic 3525.9 4748.8 1630.2 3288.7 4741.3 1338.9
R-squared 0.904 0.923 0.803 0.881 0.905 0.756
(b) Dependent variable: Labor productivity growth ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d.FRPRODjt 0.762*** 0.782*** 0.757*** 0.710*** 0.731*** 0.711***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011)
GAPijt-1 0.585*** 0.575*** 0.606*** 0.744*** 0.747*** 0.760***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009)
FDI sharejt-1 0.042 0.300** -0.165* 0.364** 1.086*** -0.180
(0.073) (0.121) (0.091) (0.156) (0.288) (0.175)
CATCHijt-1*FDI sharejt-1 0.198*** 0.240** 0.231***
(0.062) (0.096) (0.083)
CATCHijt-1 0.270*** 0.275*** 0.259***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
GAPijt-1*FDI sharejt-1 -0.149 -0.695*** 0.183
(0.127) (0.251) (0.143)
d.MKTshareijt 1.101*** 1.937*** 0.845** 1.503*** 2.633*** 1.181***
(0.326) (0.611) (0.332) (0.377) (0.695) (0.367)
Observations 143,441 70,251 72,849 143,441 70,251 72,849
F statistic 607.3 663.5 474.7 181 171.2 178.9
R-squared 0.522 0.521 0.523 0.406 0.407 0.408
Notes: Firm fixed effects are controlled for. Year and industry dummies are included. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent  level,
respectively.(a) Dependent variable: lnTFPijt - lnTFPijt-3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d3.FRPRODjt 0.875*** 0.887*** 0.839*** 0.992*** 1.003*** 0.957***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
GAPijt-3 0.246*** 0.261*** 0.230*** 1.050*** 1.086*** 0.999***
Appendix Table 5. Estimation results (3-year lagged, Based on the majority ownership
definition)
GAPijt-3 0.246 0.261 0.230 1.050 1.086 0.999
(0.009) (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009)
FDI sharejt-3 0.590*** 0.665* 0.621** 0.157* 0.198 0.023
(0.226) (0.391) (0.273) (0.090) (0.161) (0.097)
d3.MKTshareijt 5.427*** 6.721*** 5.062*** 2.910*** 2.903*** 3.389***
(0.957) (1.600) (1.171) (0.615) (0.934) (0.462)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 92,052 46,081 45,971 92,052 46,081 45,971
F statistic 352.7 681.2 125.4 3598.6 5710.5 1295.1
R-squared 0.824 0.872 0.686 0.92 0.939 0.798
(b) Dependent variable: lnLPijt - lnLPijt-3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg Services All Mfg Services All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d3.FRPRODjt 0.369*** 0.382*** 0.351*** 0.869*** 0.897*** 0.832***
(0.014) (0.026) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.013)
GAPijt-3 0.279*** 0.284*** 0.272*** 1.024*** 1.066*** 0.974***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011)
FDI sharejt-3 0.048 0.292 0.069 0.211** 0.311** 0.060
(0.175) (0.338) (0.137) (0.093) (0.158) (0.102)
d3.MKTshareijt 2.295*** 3.308*** 1.593*** 1.226*** 2.223*** 1.197***
(0 451) (0 948) (0 523) (0 345) (0 602) (0 358) (0.451) (0.948) (0.523) (0.345) (0.602) (0.358)
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 92,313 46,123 45,989 92,313 46,123 45,989
F statistic 68.57 67.15 93.39 269.5 282.9 246.5
R-squared 0.247 0.244 0.226 0.543 0.572 0.505
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered within a sector and year for equations
(1)-(3)) are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.(a) Dependent variable: lnTFPijt - lnTFPijt-3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d3.FRPRODjt 0.988*** 0.998*** 0.960*** 0.992*** 1.003*** 0.958***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
GAPijt-3 0.864*** 0.900*** 0.815*** 1.039*** 1.074*** 0.988***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009)
FDI sharejt-3 -0.189* -0.153 -0.271** -0.731*** -0.812*** -0.871***
(0.098) (0.170) (0.106) (0.175) (0.271) (0.218)
CATCHijt-3*FDI sharejt-3 0.690*** 0.973*** 0.592***
(0.102) (0.189) (0.106)
CATCHijt-3 0.254*** 0.253*** 0.247***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
GAPijt-3*FDI sharejt-3 0.614*** 0.735*** 0.596***
(0.119) (0.196) (0.143)
d3.MKTshareijt 2.670*** 2.641*** 3.109*** 2.942*** 2.920*** 3.429***
(0.561) (0.886) (0.420) (0.615) (0.932) (0.462)
Observations 92,052 46,081 45,971 92,052 46,081 45,971
F statistic 3960.7 6133.2 1521.9 3552.4 5542.8 1282.8
R-squared 0.932 0.947 0.831 0.92 0.939 0.798
(b) Dependent variable: lnLPijt - lnLPijt-3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Mfg. Services All Mfg. Services
d3.FRPRODjt 0.887*** 0.906*** 0.857*** 0.869*** 0.896*** 0.833***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016) (0.014)
GAPijt-3 0.839*** 0.876*** 0.796*** 1.013*** 1.050*** 0.964***
(0.013) (0.022) (0.013) (0.010) (0.016) (0.011)
FDI sharejt-3 -0.039 -0.047 -0.061 -0.589*** -0.791*** -0.624***
(0.100) (0.169) (0.110) (0.171) (0.275) (0.209)
CATCHijt-3*FDI sharejt-3 0.533*** 0.943*** 0.336***
(0.099) (0.176) (0.111)
CATCHijt-3 0.268*** 0.257*** 0.270***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
GAPijt-3*FDI sharejt-3 0.661*** 1.001*** 0.530***
(0.137) (0.241) (0.165)
d3.MKTshareijt 0.968*** 1.796*** 0.964*** 1.242*** 2.229*** 1.218***
(0.324) (0.586) (0.323) (0.345) (0.600) (0.359)
Observations 92,313 46,123 45,989 91,644 45,643 45,801
F statistic 498 572.7 376.6 293.4 312.4 242.6
R-squared 0.613 0.63 0.589 0.543 0.572 0.504
Notes: Firm fixed effects are controlled. Year and industry dummies are included. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are in parentheses, with ***, **, and * indicating significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level,
respectively.
Appendix Table 6. FDI spillovers and catch-up firms (3-year lagged, Based on the majority ownership
definition)